polanyi

Orthodoxy and Dissent by Nathan Jones

Michael Polanyi:

I am not arguing against the present balance between the powers of orthodoxy and the rights of dissent in science. I merely insist on acknowledgment of the fact that the scientific method is, and must be, disciplined by an orthodoxy which can permit only a limited degree of dissent, and that such dissent is fraught with grave risks to the dissenter. I demand a clear recognition of this situation for the sake of our intellectual honesty as scientists, and I charge that this situation is not recognized today but is, on the contrary, obscured by current declarations about science. Take this by Bertrand Russell:

β€œThe triumphs of science are due to the substitution of observation and inference for authority. Every attempt to revive authority in intellectual matters is a retrograde step. And it is part of the scientific attitude that the pronouncements of science do not claim to be certain but only the most probable on the basis of evidence. One of the great benefits that science confers upon those who understand its spirit is that it enables them to live without the decisive support of subjective authority.”

Such statements obscure the fact that the authority of current scientific opinion is indispensable to the discipline of scientific institutions; that its functions are invaluable, even though its dangers are an unceasing menace to scientific progress. I have seen no evidence that this authority is exercised without claims of certainty for its own teachings. In any case, it is a mistake to assume that it is easier to justify scientific opinion that merely makes claims of probability than one that makes claims of certainty. Both express a commitment, and to this extent both must go beyond the evidence.

Excerpted from β€œThe Potential Theory of Adsorption: Authority in Science Has Its Uses and Dangers” in Science vol. 141, pp. 1010-1013 (1963).

(In the panel above, Polanyi at left, Russell at right.)