Orthodoxy and Dissent by Nathan Jones

Michael Polanyi:

I am not arguing against the present balance between the powers of orthodoxy and the rights of dissent in science. I merely insist on acknowledgment of the fact that the scientific method is, and must be, disciplined by an orthodoxy which can permit only a limited degree of dissent, and that such dissent is fraught with grave risks to the dissenter. I demand a clear recognition of this situation for the sake of our intellectual honesty as scientists, and I charge that this situation is not recognized today but is, on the contrary, obscured by current declarations about science. Take this by Bertrand Russell:

“The triumphs of science are due to the substitution of observation and inference for authority. Every attempt to revive authority in intellectual matters is a retrograde step. And it is part of the scientific attitude that the pronouncements of science do not claim to be certain but only the most probable on the basis of evidence. One of the great benefits that science confers upon those who understand its spirit is that it enables them to live without the decisive support of subjective authority.”

Such statements obscure the fact that the authority of current scientific opinion is indispensable to the discipline of scientific institutions; that its functions are invaluable, even though its dangers are an unceasing menace to scientific progress. I have seen no evidence that this authority is exercised without claims of certainty for its own teachings. In any case, it is a mistake to assume that it is easier to justify scientific opinion that merely makes claims of probability than one that makes claims of certainty. Both express a commitment, and to this extent both must go beyond the evidence.

Excerpted from “The Potential Theory of Adsorption: Authority in Science Has Its Uses and Dangers” in Science vol. 141, pp. 1010-1013 (1963).

(In the panel above, Polanyi at left, Russell at right.)

Human nobility expressed in the virtue of the citizen by Nathan Jones

Although many might be willing to admit that one’s duties toward one’s own take precedence over those toward mankind at large, it might well be asked why it is necessary to harm enemies, or why there need be enemies at all. The answer is twofold. There are unjust men who would destroy the good things and the good life of one’s own family or nation if one did not render them impotent. And, even though there were not men who are natively unjust, there is a scarcity of good things in the world. The good life of one group of men leaves other groups outside who would like, and may even be compelled, to take away the good things of the first group. To have a family or a city that is one’s own implies the distinction between insiders and outsiders; and the outsiders are potential enemies. Justice as helping friends and harming enemies is peculiarly a political definition of justice, and its dignity stands or falls with the dignity of political life. Every nation has wars and must defend itself, it can only do so if it has citizens who care for it and are willing to kill the citizens of other nations. If the distinction between friends and enemies, and the inclination to help the former and harm the latter, were obliterated from the heart and mind of man, political life would be impossible. This is the necessary political definition of justice, and it produces its specific kind of human nobility expressed in the virtue of the citizen.
— Allan Bloom in his "Interpretive Essay" on Plato's Republic (1968)

See also: The Concept of the Political by Carl Schmitt (1933).

Walkabout by Nathan Jones

After not shooting for several weeks, I took my Nikon FM3A for a walk around the golf course. These are some of the things I saw. (Nikkor 35 mm f/1.4, Ilford HP5+, souped in Ilfosol 3.)